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So let me cut to the chase. When I hear allegations of Marines
denigrating their fellow Marines, I don't think such behavior is that of true
warriors or warfighters.1
- General Robert B. Neller, former Commandant of the Marine
Corps
I. INTRODUCTION
“It is extremely widespread . . . . If it happened to me [it has] got to
be happening to a lot of other females.”2 Kally Wayne, a former Marine and
one of the many victims of the Marines United Scandal, says it well in these
short words.3 As of 2016, revenge porn, also called nonconsensual image
sharing, has threatened or victimized one in twenty-five Americans.4
Revenge porn consists of “[r]evealing or sexually explicit images or videos
of a person posted on the internet, typically by a former sexual partner,
without the consent of the subject and in order to cause them distress or
embarrassment.”5 For example, in the case of Kally Wayne, her ex-boyfriend
posted a private sex tape they had made together four years ago on a private
Facebook page.6
In 2004, New Jersey became the first state to pass legislation
criminalizing revenge porn.7 Today, all but four states, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Wyoming, have revenge porn laws.8
Currently, there is no federal law regarding nonconsensual photo sharing for
1
U.S. Marines (@USMC), TWITTER, at 00:59 (Mar. 7, 2017), https://twitter.com/USMC/status
/839189581706723331?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fcdn.knightlab.com%2Flibs%
2Ftimeline3%2Flatest%2Fembed%2Findex.html%3Fsource%3D1gX3lNs_wXR4-D2vHp-rPQzUpw6S2
EdpNo36Rcu3qqKU%26font%3DDefault%26lang%3Den%26initial_zoom%3D2%26height%3D650;
Jared Keller, The Commandant Has A Strong Message About 'Marines United' Everyone Needs To See,
TASK & PURPOSE (Mar. 7, 2017, 4:16 PM), https://taskandpurpose.com /neller-marines-united-nudephoto-response.
2
Kelly McCarthy, Alleged Victim of Marine Corps Nude Photo Scandal Speaks Out, ABC NEWS
(Mar. 8, 2017, 9:59 AM) (quoting Interview by Martha Raadtz with Kally Wayne (Mar. 2017)),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/alleged-victim-marine-corps-nude-photo-scandal-speaks/story?id=45985740.
3
Id.
4
Lori Janjigian, Nearly 10 Million Americans are Victims of Revenge Porn, Study Finds, BUS.
INSIDER (Dec. 13, 2016, 5:03 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/revenge-porn-study-nearly-10million-americans-are-victims-2016-12.
5
Revenge Porn, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/revenge_porn (last visited Dec. 27,
2020).
6
McCarthy, supra note 2.
7
Tal Kopan, States Criminalize ‘Revenge Porn’, POLITICO (Oct. 10, 2013, 11:10 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/states-criminalize-revenge-porn-099082; see also N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:14-9(b) (West 2004).
8
See 46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER CIV. RTS. INITIATIVE,
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2020); States With Revenge
Porn Laws, C.A. GOLDBERG VICTIM’S RIGHT L. FIRM, https://www.cagoldberglaw.com/states-withrevenge-porn-laws/#1558635914029-7405b04a-e016 (last visited Dec. 27, 2020).
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members of the general public.9 In the years leading up to the Marines United
Scandal, the armed forces had implemented various programs and protocols
designed to respond to reports of sexual assault and harassment, but “Marine
Corps officials confirmed that none include[d] procedures for dealing with
sexual exploitation of this nature,” such as revenge porn.10
After the negative publicity surrounding the Marines United Scandal,
Congress decided to send a message that this form of harassment was
unacceptable for servicemembers.11 In 2017, Congress enacted the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, which made amendments to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), the governing statutes for
criminal offenses for federal military members.12 One of those amendments,
which took effect in January 2019, was Article 117a, UCMJ, “[w]rongful
broadcast or distribution of intimate visual images.”13 Along with clarifying
what constitutes the wrongdoing, Article 117a contains definitions of specific
terminology.14
This Comment will address three topics. Part II will examine the
background of distributing explicit photos in the military, including the highly
publicized Marines United Scandal. Part II will also discuss the already
existing Article 120c, UCMJ, “[i]ndecent viewing, visual recording, or
broadcasting,” and its pitfalls in addressing revenge porn, leaving a class of
individuals still vulnerable to the distribution of sexually explicit images
without their consent.15 Part III will analyze the elements Article 117a in
detail, explaining the significance and difficulties of each element, including
the role Article 117a has for military order and discipline.

9
Nonconsensual Pornography (Revenge Porn) Law in the United States, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballot
pedia.org/Nonconsensual_pornography_(revenge_porn)_laws_in_the_United_States (last visited Sept. 8,
2020).
10
Thomas J. Brennan, An Attack From Within: Male Marines Ambush Women In Uniform, WAR
HORSE (Mar. 7, 2017), https://thewarhorse.org/newsroom-archive/an-attack-from-within-male-marinesambush-women-in-uniform/.
11
Devon L. Suits, Updates to UCMJ Criminalize Unauthorized Distribution of Sexual Imagery, U.S.
ARMY (Feb 13, 2018), https://www.army.mil/article/200539/updates_to_ucmj_criminalize_unauthorized_
distribution_of_sexual_imagery.
12
See generally National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–91 (2017).
Those subject to the UCMJ include, but are not limited to, members of a regular component of the armed
forces, cadets, aviation cadets, midshipmen, members of a reserve component, and Army and Air National
Guard members when they are in Federal service. See 10 U.S.C. §802(a)(1)–(3).
13
10 U.S.C. § 917a; Collette Langos, Ph.D., Reforming the Army’s Online Policies: An Opportunity
for Leadership, ARMY LAWYER, Issue 1 2019, at 49, 50.
14
See 10 U.S.C. § 917a(b).
15
See id § 920c(a).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Something Borrowed, Nothing New
The nonconsensual sharing of sexually explicit images is not a new
problem. In Anthony Swofford’s memoir, Jarhead, Swofford shared stories
of his time in the Gulf War during the early 1990s.16 In his memoir, Swofford
told the tale of his then-girlfriend, Kristina, cheating on him while he was
deployed in Saudi Arabia.17 After learning of Kristina’s cheating, and while
shuffling through letters and photos, Swofford came across three seminude
portraits of Kristina, covered only by a dress-blue blouse.18 He wondered
what to do with them.19 In the platoon existed a “Wall of Shame,” where
photos of forty or more women were duct-taped to a six-foot-tall post.20 On
the duct tape were messages describing the events that supposedly earned
these women their spots on the wall.21 Swofford added the photos of Kristina
to the collection and wrote: “I don’t know but I’ve been told she’s seeing
someone new.”22
B. Marines (Not) United
Fast forward twenty-seven years. Thomas Brennan, a former Marine
and reporter for The War Horse, made a big announcement.23 He revealed
that the Department of Defense (“DoD”) was investigating hundreds of
Marines who were a part of a Facebook page used to solicit and share
hundreds, maybe even thousands, of naked photographs of female
servicemembers and veterans.24 The news became known as the “Marines
United Scandal.”25
1. The Leak
The activity on a Facebook page called “Marines United” was
uncovered by a nonprofit journalism news organization called The War
Horse.26 Brennan, the founder of the organization, first contacted the Marine
Corps Headquarters on January 30, 2017.27 Within a day, the social media
16
See generally Anthony Swofford, JARHEAD: A MARINE’S CHRONICLE OF THE GULF WAR AND
OTHER BATTLES (2003).
17
Id. at 68–69.
18
Id. at 91.
19
See id.
20
Id. at 91–92.
21
See id. at 92.
22
Id. (italics omitted).
23
See Brennan, supra note 10.
24
Id.
25
Jared Keller, The Rise And Fall (And Rise) of ‘Marines United’, TASK & PURPOSE (Mar. 16, 2017,
11:20 AM), https://taskandpurpose.com/rise-fall-rise-marines-united.
26
Brennan, supra note 10.
27
Anna Hiatt, How the Marines United Investigation and Scandal Unfolded, WAR HORSE (July 11,
2017), https://thewarhorse.org/how-the-marines-united-investigation-and-scandal-unfolded/.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol46/iss1/5

2020]

Veteran to Victim

83

accounts associated with sharing photos were deleted by Facebook and
Google, and a formal investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative
Service began.28 The formerly active Google Drive folders linked to the
Facebook page included files of women’s “names, military branches, nude
photographs, screenshots of their social media accounts, and images of sexual
acts.”29 Many of the images seemed to come from consensual, but private,
exchanges of sexually intimate images, some even taken by the women
themselves.30 However, the Marines United Facebook page was not deleted,
and it did not take long for the page’s activity to be revitalized—photos were
again being posted in the Marines United group on February 16, 2017.31
After a continued push for the Pentagon to give more in-depth
comments about the ongoing investigation, the Marine Corps Headquarters
released a ten-page memo and gave it to about 100 generals.32 The memo
explained the nonconsensual photo sharing on the Marines United Facebook
page and provided talking points, along with an outlined public relations
strategy.33 Fearful that the memo would undermine the story, The War Horse
and Reveal released the full story of the Marines United Scandal.34 In the
following days, the story became headline news in more than a hundred media
outlets, including The New York Times and The Washington Post.35
2. The Response
The following week, former Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, and
former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert Neller, made
statements reprimanding the Marines involved in the nonconsensual photo
sharing.36 General Neller released a video sharing a strong message about the
Marines United Facebook group, emphasizing the true meaning of being a
Marine and the high standards to which they are called to adhere.37 He
condemned those Marines involved in the group, calling their acts selfish,
28

Brennan, supra note 10.
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id: Hiatt, supra note 27.
32
Hiatt, supra note 27.
33
Id.
34
Id.; see also Thomas James Brennan, Hundreds of Marines Investigated for Sharing Photos of
Naked Colleagues, REVEAL (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.revealnews.org/blog/hundreds-of-marines-inve
stigated-for-sharing-photos-of-naked-colleagues/.
35
See, e.g., Dave Philipps, Inquiry Opens Into How a Network of Marines Shared Illicit Images of
Female Peers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/inquiry-opens-intohow-30000-marines-shared-illicit-images-of-female-peers.html?_r=0; Thomas Gibbons-Neff, ‘I’m Never
Reenlisting’: Marine Corps Rocked by Nude-Photo Scandal, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2017, 8:41 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/03/05/im-never-reenlisting-marine-corpsrocked-by-nude-photo-scandal/.
36
Hiatt, supra note 27.
37
See generally U.S. Marines (@USMC), supra note 1.
29

Published by eCommons, 2020

84

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

unprofessional, and embarrassing to the Marine Corps.38 The DoD signed a
new United States Marine Corps social media policy, making it explicit that
the UCMJ unambiguously applies to sexual harassment on social media.39
On April 19, six weeks after the leak, Secretary of the Navy, Sean
Stackley, “signed new regulations that criminalized distributing intimate
photos without the subject’s consent in the Navy and the Marines.”40 The
Marines Corps separation manual was also updated, making it clear that
service members who violate the new regulations risk dishonorable discharge
because “any Marine convicted of the crime would face mandatory separation
proceedings.”41
Meanwhile, members of Congress also began to take action in
response to the scandal.42 In May 2017, the House unanimously passed the
Protecting the Rights of Individuals Against Technological Exploitation Act
(“PRIVATE Act”), which would have criminalized sharing explicit images
within the military without the subject’s consent.43 The PRIVATE Act
intended to amend Article 117 of the UCMJ by including a “prohibition on
wrongful broadcast of intimate visual images.”44 However, the PRIVATE
Act failed in the Senate after it was referred to the proper committee.45
Senator Elizabeth Warren introduced a similar bill.46 That bill was
The Protecting Servicemembers Online Act of 2017 (“Protecting
Servicemembers Act”) and was introduced in June.47 The Protecting
Servicemembers Act also would have criminalized the nonconsensual
distribution of private sexual images by amending Article 120c of the
UCMJ.48 It further amended Article 117 of the UCMJ by criminalizing
harassment.49 However, the Protecting Servicemembers Act never made it
past the Committee on Armed Services.50

38

Id.; Keller, supra note 1.
Hiatt, supra note 27.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.; Protecting the Rights of Individuals Against Technological Exploitation Act, H.R. 2052, 115th
Cong. (as passed by the House, May 24, 2017).
44
H.R. 2052. § 2.
45
See H.R. 2052 – PRIVATE Act, CONG., https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/20
52/all-actions (last visited Dec. 22, 2020) (noting that the last action the PRIVATE Act received was a
referral to the Senate Armed Services Committee).
46
See generally Protecting Servicemembers Online Act of 2017, S. 1346, 115th Cong. (2017).
47
Id.
48
Id. § 2.
49
Id. § 3.
50
See S. 1346 – Protecting Servicemembers Online Act of 2017, CONG., https://www.congress.gov/bill
/115thcongress/senatebill/1346?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22s.+1346%22%5D%7D&s=2&r=1
(last visited Dec. 22, 2020) (noting that last action the Protecting Servicemembers Online Act of 2017
received was a referral to the Senate Armed Services Committee).
39
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3. The Consequences
In the aftermath of the leak, actions were taken against those
servicemembers who participated in the Marines United Facebook group.51
One of the difficulties in punishment and accountability, specifically under
the UCMJ, stemmed from the language of Article 120c. Under Article 120c,
called “[o]ther sexual misconduct”¾which falls under the broader umbrella
of Article 120, “[r]ape and sexual assault generally”¾a person who
knowingly broadcasts or distributes any such recording is guilty of an
offense.52 However, the recording must be made under the circumstances
described in paragraphs (1) or (2) of Article 120c, which read:
(1) knowingly and wrongfully views the private area of
another person, without that other person’s consent and under
circumstances in which that other person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy; (2) knowingly photographs,
videotapes, films, or records by any means the private area of
another person, without that other person’s consent and under
circumstances in which that other person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.53
This means nonconsensual photo sharing is not punishable for those
images that servicemembers either receive or take with the consent of the
other person in the image, which was a common situation for the victims of
the Marines United Scandal.54 Along with the policies and regulations
implemented by the Marines Corps, the ineffective tool of Article 120c more
than likely led to so few courts-martial and mostly administrative discharges.
Due to the limitations of Article 120c, prosecutors and commanders
had to get creative with the specifications of the Articles available to them. A
few examples would serve to demonstrate this creativeness. First, one
servicemember was convicted under Article 127 for threatening to distribute
sexually explicit photos and a video unless he “received something
valuable.”55 As a result of this conviction, and other unrelated charges, he
was given a bad conduct discharge and was reduced in rank to private.56
Another servicemember received a bad conduct discharge, ninety days
confinement, and reduction in rank to private after he was convicted at a
51
See Shawn Snow, Seven Marines Court-Martialed in Wake of Marines United Scandal, MARINE
CORPS TIMES (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2018/03/01/
seven-marines-court-martialed-in-wake-of-marines-united-scandal/.
52
10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 920c.
53
Id. § 920c(a)(1)–(2).
54
See Brennan, supra note 10.
55
Snow, supra note 51.
56
Id.
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special court-martial under Article 80 for conspiracy to distribute a
recording.57 Surprisingly, one individual was convicted at a special courtmartial under Article 120c for filming and broadcasting of a sex act.58 As a
result, his rank was reduced to private, and he received a bad conduct
discharge and thirty days confinement.59
Other courts-martial stemming from the Marines United Scandal
included convictions for posting images of a victim’s private area; attempted
wrongful viewing of a victim’s private area without consent; and attempting
to distribute and broadcast a victim’s private area.60 All three courts-martial
resulted in bad conduct discharges, confinement, and a reduction to private.61
At the Center for Strategic and International Studies in January 2018,
and after he was asked about the Marine Corps’s progress towards solving the
issue, General Neller stated: “There’s been accountability, probably not to the
satisfaction of some.”62 As of March 1, 2018, the Marine Corps carried out
eighty dispositions of cases linked to the enforcement of the new regulations
and policies enacted after the Marines United Scandal.63 This included
fourteen non-judicial punishments, six administrative separations, twentyeight adverse administrative actions, and only seven courts-martial.64
Apart from the limited recourse available in criminal law, a victim’s
access to civil remedies is also limited. All too often, victims find it difficult
to seek relief through other avenues, such as copyright or tort law, because
they are hard cases to win, attorneys are expensive, and victims do not wish
to face publicity.65 Additionally, the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”)
is a giant barrier to victims who wish to go after the internet site that houses
the visual images.66 Under the CDA, websites and internet service providers
generally have immunity from the actions of individuals who post intimate
images of someone without that person’s consent.67 The existing law was
neither a deterrent for the perpetrators nor a remedy for the victims.68
57

Id.
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 26, 30–31 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that
that the safe harbor provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act requires actual knowledge of
infringing material); Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 450 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding plaintiff did not
suffer emotional distress that was “unendurable,” as required for liability for intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
66
See generally 47 U.S.C. § 230.
67
See id. at (c)(1); GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 759 (Tex. App. 2014) (holding
that GoDaddy acted only as a service provider, and thus could not be liable to plaintiff).
68
For further discussion on the theory of civil remedies and the CDA, see Amanda L. Cecil, Note,
Taking Back the Internet: Imposing Civil Liability on Interactive Computer Services in an Attempt to
Provide an Adequate Remedy to Victims of Nonconsensual Pornography, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2513,
58
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C. UCMJ Amended
To deter future misconduct of this degree, Congress sought out a
solution. Through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2018, they did just that.69 Under section 533 of the Act, a punitive article was
added to the UCMJ for “wrongful broadcast or distribution of intimate visual
images or visual images of sexually explicit conduct.”70 The Article, came
into effect in January 2019, was inserted after Article 117, and became known
as Article 117a.71
Article 117a contains four elements and is similar to the language of
the failed PRIVATE Act.72 The first one requires the person to knowingly
broadcast or distribute an intimate visual image of someone who is at least
eighteen years of age, is identifiable from the image, and does not consent to
the broadcast or distribution.73 The second element requires one to know, or
to have reasonably known, that the intimate visual image was made under
circumstances in which the person depicted in the image had a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding the broadcast or distribution of the image.74
The third is also a mens rea element, which requires the person to know, or to
have reasonably known, the broadcast or distribution is likely to harm or
cause harm.75 The fourth element requires the conduct to have a “reasonably
direct and palpable connection to a military mission or military
environment.”76 The enacted statute further includes a “visual image of
sexually explicit conduct” following “intimate visual image” within the first
three elements.77 After the elements, Article 117a defines certain words in
the statute, such as “broadcast,” “distribution,” and others.78
III. ANALYSIS
The following discussion analyzes, in detail, Article 117a. This
Comment dives into the “why” for each element, its strengths and
weaknesses, and what it looks like in action in real cases.

2517 (2014); Zak Franklin, Note, Justice for Revenge Porn Victims: Legal Theories to Overcome Claims
of Civil Immunity by Operators of Revenge Porn Websites, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1303, 1313–14 (2014).
69
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, 131 Stat. 1283 (2017).
70
Id. §533.
71
Id. § 533(a)
72
Compare 10 U.S.C. § 917a(a) with Protecting the Rights of Individuals Against Technological
Exploitation Act, H.R. 2052, 115th Cong. (as passed by the House, May 24, 2017).
73
10 U.S.C. § 917a(a)(1).
74
Id. § 917a(a)(2).
75
Id. § 917a(a)(3).
76
Id. § 917a(a)(4).
77
Id. § 917a(a)(1)–(3).
78
See id. § 917a(b).
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A. Definitional Issues
Article 117a provides definitions for many of the words and phrases
contained within each element of the statute, some of which need to be
understood before application of the elements themselves can be
understood.79
1. “Broadcast” and “Distribute”
Article 117a defines “broadcast” and “distribute,” either of which is
a necessary act to violate the statute.80 First, “broadcast” means to
“electronically transmit a visual image with the intent that it be viewed by a
person or persons.”81 While “distribute” means “to deliver to the actual or
constructive possession of another person, including transmission by mail or
electronic means.”82
In United States v. Davis (“Davis”), a defendant’s Article 120c charge
was dismissed for failure to “broadcast” the recording in accordance with the
statute’s definition.83 In Davis, the defendant showed a fellow soldier a cell
phone recording he had made of the victim’s buttocks without her consent
while she was engaging in intercourse with him.84 The defendant asserted
that “the mere act of playing [a] video recording of [the victim] on his cell
phone in front of one other physically present soldier does not constitute
‘broadcasting’ . . . .”85 The court agreed, ruling that an electronic transmission
was required, which requires both “an electronic device to send the
transmission and an electronic device to receive the transmission.”86
The Davis court also addressed the definition of “distribute” to further
its argument.87 It stated that distributing allows both physical and electronic
transferences, whereas broadcasting is limited to only electronic transfers.88
By concluding that Congress must have intentionally offered only one mode
of transference for “broadcast,” the court concluded there was “no basis for
finding that Congress intended the definition of ‘broadcast’ to include the
mere physical act of displaying a video to one other physically present
soldier.”89 Thus, the defendant did not “electronically transmit” and therefore
79
The statute also defines “reasonable expectation of privacy” which will be discussed below. See
infra Part III.C.
80
10 U.S.C. § 917a(a)(1), (b)(1)–(2).
81
Id. § 917a(b)(1).
82
Id. § 917a(b)(2).
83
No. ARMY 20160069, 2018 CCA LEXIS 417, at *24–28 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2018). The
definition for “broadcast” under 120c is identical to Article 117a’s definition. Compare 10 U.S.C. §
920c(d)(4) with 10 U.S.C. § 917a(b)(1).
84
Davis, 2018 CCA LEXIS 417 at *3–4.
85
Id. at *24.
86
Id. at *25.
87
See id. at *25–26.
88
Id.
89
Id. at *26.
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did not “broadcast” the recording to another person.90
This raises the question: Were Anthony Swofford and other members
of his platoon broadcasting or distributing the photos they shared on the “Wall
of Shame?”91 Based on the analysis from the Davis court, the platoon
members’ actions would not be a “broadcast” because they did not involve
electronic transmissions.92 However, it could be argued that they did
“distribute” the photos because, by putting them on the “Wall of Shame,” they
were giving constructive possession of the photos to other members of the
platoon.93 The members who put the photos on the wall gave up their actual
possession in order to give someone else the opportunity to view it. This is
distinguishable from Davis, where neither the photo, nor a copy of the photo,
did not leave the defendant’s possession.94
2. “Intimate Visual Image” and “Visual Image of Sexually Explicit
Conduct”
Article 117a specifically limits its reach to an “intimate visual image
of another person or a visual image of sexually explicit conduct . . . .”95 The
statute further defines what each of those are. A “visual image” is defined to
be any of the following:
(A) Any developed or undeveloped photograph, picture,
film, or video. (B) Any digital or computer image, picture,
film, or video made by any means, including those
transmitted by any means, including streaming media, even
if not stored in a permanent format. (C) Any digital or
electronic data capable of conversion into a visual image.96
A “visual image” becomes intimate when it involves the private area
of a person.97 “Sexually explicit conduct” is any “actual or simulated genitalgenital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact, or oral-anal contact
. . . or sadistic or masochistic abuse.”98
A hypothetical was presented in People v. Austin (“Austin”).99 In
Austin, the circuit court suggested that the Illinois revenge porn statute “would
90

Id. at *27.
See id. at *25–27; Swofford, supra note 16, at 91–92.
92
See Davis, 2018 CCA LEXIS 417 at *25; Swofford, supra note 16, at 91–92.
93
See Davis, 2018 CCA LEXIS 417 at *25–26; Swofford, supra note 16, at 91–92.
94
Compare Davis, 2018 CCA LEXIS 417 at *24–27 with Swofford, supra note 16, at 91–92.
95
10 U.S.C. § 917a(a)(1).
96
Id. § 917a(b)(7).
97
Id. § 917a(b)(3). A “private area” is defined as “the naked or underwear-clad genitalia, anus,
buttocks, or female areola or nipple.” Id. § 917a(b)(4).
98
Id. § 917a(b)(6).
99
See No. 123910, 2019 IL 123910, at ¶ 96 (Ill. Oct. 18, 2019) (LEXIS).
91
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impose criminal liability on a person who discovers and shares with other
family members nude sketches of his or her grandmother that were created by
his or her grandfather but were discovered in an attic after her death.”100
Entertaining the circuit court’s Titanic-esque scenario, the Illinois Supreme
Court referred back to the purpose of the law, stating that the statute is
obviously “intended to protect living victims from the invasion of privacy and
potential threat to the health and safety that is intrinsic in the disclosure of a
private sexual image.”101 Thus, the court rejected the premise of the lower
court’s hypothetical.102
3. Mens Rea
For the first three elements, a mens rea requirement is attached to
each one.103 There is “knowingly and wrongfully” in the first element and
“knows or reasonably should have known” in the second and third.104 Courts
have generally found “wrongful” to be a sufficient description of culpability
because “there is no difficulty in separating ‘wrongful’ from ‘innocent’
conduct.”105
“‘[Knows] or reasonably should have known’ reflects not distinct
elements, but alternative theories of liability. They represent two possible
means of possessing the statutorily-defined mens rea to establish
criminality.”106 In an appeal from an Article 120(b)(3)(A), sexual assault
charge, the United States Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals stated
“knows” was an actual knowledge standard and “reasonably should have
known” was a negligence standard.107 “A scienter of ‘reasonably should have
known’ and a mens rea of simple negligence are complementary.”108 Due to
the nature of the statute and its proximity to First Amendment issues, a
military judge must “clearly articulate the critical distinction between
permissible and prohibited behavior from the constitutional standpoint.”109
This guidance on First Amendment concerns should also be applied to Article
117a cases.

100
Id. The Illinois statue defines “image” as “a photograph, film, videotape, digital recording, or other
depiction or portrayal of an object, including a human body.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-23.5(a)
(West 2015).
101
Austin, 2019 IL 123910 at ¶ 96.
102
See id.
103
See 10 U.S.C. § 917a(a)(1)–(3).
104
Id.
105
See, e.g., United States v. Chance, No. Army 20140072, 2016 CCA LEXIS 241, at *9 (A. Ct. Crim.
App. Apr. 18, 2016); United States v. Rapert, 75 M.J. 164, 168 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (holding that the mens rea
requirement of “wrongful” in 10 U.S.C. § 934, communicating a threat against the President of the United
States, was sufficient).
106
United States v. Shermot, 77 M.J. 742, 745 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2018) (italics omitted).
107
Id.
108
United States v. Ferguson, 40 M.J. 823, 831 (N-M.C.M.R. 1994) (italics omitted).
109
United States v. King, No. ARMY 20130808, 2015 CCA LEXIS 321, at *3 (A. Ct. Crim. App. July,
31 2015).
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B. The Conduct
The first element of Article 117a explains that the law applies to
anyone:
who knowingly and wrongfully broadcasts or distributes an
intimate visual image of another person or a visual image of
sexually explicit conduct involving a person who—(A) is at
least 18 years of age at the time the intimate visual image or
visual image of sexually explicit conduct was created; (B) is
identifiable from the intimate visual image or visual image of
sexually explicit conduct itself, or from information
displayed in connection with the intimate visual image or
visual image of sexually explicit conduct; and (C) does not
explicitly consent to the broadcast or distribution of the
intimate visual image or visual image of sexually explicit
conduct.110
The age requirement distinguishes this Article from the UCMJ’s child
pornography Article, where the age requirement is under the age of eighteen,
regardless of consent to the individual depicted in the image.111 While the age
sub-element is not the subject of great debate, the other pieces of the element
have their own unique intricacies.
1. Identifiability
The person must be identifiable from either the image itself or from
the information displayed in connection with the image.112 This sub-element
boils down to an issue of authentication of evidence: Is the victim the actual
person depicted in the image in question? Authentication or identification of
an item of evidence—or a person—must be supported by “evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”113 The
Military Rules of Evidence outlines examples of sufficient evidence, such as
witness testimony, distinctive characteristics, or opinion about a voice.114
The facts in United States v. Lee (“Lee”) show one of the easiest ways
to establish the identity of a person in a visual image: facial recognition.115 In
Lee, the admissibility of a video recording was appealed under authentication

110

10 U.S.C. § 917a(a)(1)(A)–(C).
See id § 943 (subjecting members of the armed forces to punishment by a court martial for certain
federal offenses, including child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A).
112
Id. § 917a(a)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1), (8).
113
MIL. R. EVID. 901(a).
114
Id. § 901(b)(1), (4), (5).
115
See generally No. ACM 38888, 2017 CCA LEXIS 185 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2017).
111
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issues.116 After it was shared with many people, the recording was given to
law enforcement the day after it was made and after the victim had reported
the assault.117 The first one to receive the video, MT, attended the party and
testified that he had seen the victim at the party, and later in the backseat of
the car where the video was recorded.118 MT recognized the victim in the
video being the same person he saw in the backseat of the car.119 Another
recipient of the video also identified the victim as the person in the video.120
When a third witness saw the video, she identified the Appellant by his voice,
a portion of his face, and a tattoo on his right arm.121
Appellant argued that “no witness testified that the recording
accurately depicted the events as they occurred” and that the court should
apply the “silent witness” theory, which authenticates a videotape through the
process by which the videotape was taken.122 The court, however, held that
the “silent witness” theory generally applies only “to circumstances in which
government actors or private security cameras generate the recording at
issue.”123 Therefore, “when the facts demonstrate that [a] recording was
found in a defendant’s possession, it should not be ‘subject to the same
[authentication] requirements’” applied to government agents or
informants.124 Appellant admitted to making the recording and sending it to
MT.125 With Appellant’s admission and the testimonies from several
witnesses, the court held the trial judge did not err in determining a sufficient
foundation was established for the recording’s admissibility.126
Identifying a person in an image may not always be as simple as facial
recognition. Identification may be compromised when a person’s face has
been blurred or even blocked. However, based on a rudimentary reading of
the Military Rules of Evidence, distinctive characteristics can be used to
identify a person.127 In Lee, the appellant was identified through voice
recognition, a portion of his face, and a tattoo on his arm.128 A prosecutor
should be prepared to get creative with evidence to prove the identity of the
116

Id. at *8.
Id. at *8–9.
Id. at *9.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at *11. Under the “silent witness” theory:
a videotape is authenticated by establishing the process by which the videotape was
taken, i.e. the installation of the camera, use and security of the camera, testing, and
removal of the film and testimony as to the chain of custody. Upon establishing this
foundation, it is admissible . . . without corroborative eyewitness.
Id. (quoting United States v. Reichart, 31 M.J. 521, 523–24 (A.C.M.R. 1990)).
123
Id.
124
Id. at *11–12 (quoting United States v. Kandiel, 865 F.2d 967, 973 (8th Cir. 1989)).
125
Id. at *12.
126
Id. at *12–13.
127
MIL. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
128
Lee, 2017 CCA LEXIS 185 at *9.
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https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol46/iss1/5

2020]

Veteran to Victim

93

person in an otherwise unidentifiable image.129
2. Consent
Wrongful broadcast or distribution of an intimate visual image
involves a person who “does not explicitly consent to the broadcast or
distribution of the intimate visual image or visual image of sexually explicit
conduct.”130 Merriam-Webster defines “explicit” as “fully revealed or
expressed without vagueness, implication, or ambiguity: leaving no question
as to meaning or intent.”131 In other words, if one does not have a verbal “yes”
from the person in the image to distribute or broadcast the image, they could
be subject to potential Article 117a charges.
C. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Article 117a requires the defendant:
know[] or reasonably should have known that the intimate
visual image or visual image of sexually explicit conduct was
made under circumstances in which the person depicted in
the intimate visual image or visual image of sexually explicit
conduct retained a reasonable expectation of privacy
regarding any broadcast or distribution of the intimate visual
image or visual image of sexually explicit conduct.132
Article 117a goes on further to define “reasonable expectation of
privacy” as “circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that
a private area of the person, or sexually explicit conduct involving the person,
would not be visible to the public.”133 Mary Anne Franks, president of Cyber
Civil Rights Initiative, raises the right question: “Why do we not think of
naked photos as being as deserving of privacy protection as things like our
medical records?”134
However, a reasonable expectation of privacy is not yet one of the
recognized categories of speech excluded from First Amendment

129
A hypothetical question raised by this Author is how would identification occur if the victim’s head
was photoshopped onto the body of another person’s nude body? Although this Comment will not analyze
potential answers, this Author finds such hypothetical useful to readers.
130
10 U.S.C. § 917a(a)(1)(C) (emphasis added).
131
Explicit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/explicit (last visited
Dec. 27, 2020).
132
10 U.S.C. § 917a(a)(2).
133
Id. § 917a(b)(5).
134
Lorelei Laird, First Amendment Defense Claims Could Threaten ‘Revenge Pornography’ Statutes,
ABA J. (Dec. 2019, 6:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/web/article/first-amendment-defense-claimscould-threaten-revenge-pornography-statutes.
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protections.135 The Supreme Court has stated that it “in no sense suggest[s]
that speech on private matters falls into one of the narrow and well-defined
classes of expression which carries so little social value, such as obscenity,
that the State can prohibit and punish such expression by all persons in its
jurisdiction.”136 Without a holding from the Supreme Court on the
constitutionality of revenge porn statutes, states are split as to whether an
expectation of privacy element in statutes is constitutional.137
In State v. Ahmed, the State of Minnesota appealed a district court’s
order that dismissed three counts of felony nonconsensual dissemination of
private sexual images against the Respondent for lack of probable cause.138
On appeal, the court reviewed the dismissal based on the legal question on
what the statute actually prohibited.139 Focusing on the phrase “reasonably
should have known,” the court held that the statute did not require that
Respondent have actual knowledge that the victim had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.140 To support its reasoning, the court referred to the
state supreme court’s understanding of “reason to know” in the context of
child pornography, where the language is a recklessness standard meaning
“that the possessor is subjectively aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the work involves a minor.”141 The court held there was sufficient
evidence to support the conclusion that the Respondent reasonably should
have known that the victim had a reasonable expectation of privacy when the
photo was obtained or created, and that the image itself “depicts nothing
negating the ordinary expectation of privacy that attends sexual activity.”142
One year later, the very same court held that the statute carried a mens rea of
negligence and that the statute was constitutionally invalid.143
Illinois has taken a different view on a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy. It has deemed the speech at issue as a “purely private
matter” and is subject only to intermediate scrutiny.144 Restricting speech on
private matters does not raise the same concerns as restricting speech on
public matters, such as self-censorship and interference with the marketplace
of ideas.145
Military courts have “explored the boundaries of a person’s
135

State v. Casillas, 938 N.W.2d 74, 83 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019).
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
See Laird, supra note 134.
138
State v. Ahmed, No. A18-0891, 2018 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1048, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec.
17, 2018).
139
Id. at *5.
140
Id. at *8–9.
141
Id. at *8 (citing State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Minn. 2007)).
142
Id. at *11.
143
State v. Casillas, 938 N.W.2d 74, 85 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019). The statute was held constitutionally
invalid not for its inclusion of a privacy element, but for the absence of an intent-to-harm element. See id.
at 77; see also infra Section III.D.
144
People v. Austin, No. 123910, 2019 IL 123910, at ¶ 53 (Ill. Oct. 18, 2019) (LEXIS).
145
Id. at ¶54 (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011)).
136
137
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reasonable expectation of privacy.”146 In United States v. Raines (“Raines”),
the appellant video-recorded his sexual encounters with multiple women
without their consent.147 Appellant argued that the women should have
noticed the camera and that by agreeing to have sex, they implicitly agreed to
the recording.148 The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Appeals called this
argument “patently ridiculous” and held that “agreeing to have sex with
another person does not remove all reasonable expectations of privacy.”149
In Davis, the court held the victim did not lose her reasonable
expectation of privacy even when she engaged in sex with two individuals in
the presence of a third person who was passed out nearby and unaware of the
sexual activity occurring in the room.150 She also retained that reasonable
expectation of privacy while engaging in the sexual intercourse behind a
locked door in a motel room.151
The Appellant in Lee made two arguments in favor of why the victim
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when the recording was
made in the backseat of a car: (1) the victim did not have a possessory interest
in the car where the recording was made and (2) the victim was voluntarily
naked in the car in what he asserted was a public area.152 With respect to the
first argument, the court rejected the Appellant’s attempt to incorporate the
Fourth Amendment’s definition of “reasonable expectation of privacy”
because Article 120c itself defines the term.153 However, the court reiterated
that the victim’s “belief that she could disrobe in privacy or that her private
area would not be visible to the public must still be reasonable under the
circumstances.”154 The facts of Lee established that the Appellant and victim
left a party and went to the parked car with the intent to engage in sexual
intercourse in private.155 Although other partygoers eventually found the two
engaging in intercourse and watched them, this did not preclude a finding that
the victim still had a reasonable expectation of privacy.156 While all three of
these cases illustrate reasonable expectations of privacy in the context of
nonconsensual recording, the principles are transferable with respect to a

146
United States v. Davis, No. ARMY 20160069, 2018 CCA LEXIS 417, at *22 (A. Ct. Crim. App.
Aug. 16, 2018) (internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Raines, No. NMCCA 201400027,
2014 CCA LEXIS 600 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2014).
147
2014 CCA LEXIS 600, at *3.
148
Id. at *13.
149
Id.
150
2018 CCA LEXIS 417 at *3, *22–23.
151
Id. at *23.
152
No. ACM 38888, 2017 CCA LEXIS 185, at *14 (A.F. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2017).
153
Id. at *15.
154
Id. at *16.
155
Id.
156
Id. at *17.
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reasonable expectation of privacy in nonconsensual image sharing.
D. Harm
A person charged with Article 117a must:
know[] or reasonably should have known that the broadcast
or distribution of the intimate visual image or visual image
of sexually explicit conduct is likely—(A) to cause harm,
harassment, intimidation, emotional distress, or financial loss
for the person depicted in the intimate visual image or visual
image of sexually explicit conduct; or (B) to harm
substantially the depicted person with respect to that person’s
health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition,
reputation, or personal relationships.157
Seventeen states that have laws prohibiting nonconsensual
dissemination of private sexual images have some sort of intent-to-harm
element.158 By providing an element that addresses the effects of the
prohibited conduct, Article 117a bolsters its defense against First Amendment
challenges. The issue, however, may arise in the mens rea of this element—
“knows or reasonably should have known.”159
In Austin, the Illinois Supreme Court held that an intent-to-harm
element is unnecessary.160 The court observed that “the motive underlying an
intentional and unauthorized dissemination of a private sexual image has no
bearing on the resulting harm suffered by the victim. A victim whose image
has been disseminated without consent suffers the same privacy violation and
negative consequences of exposure, regardless of the disseminator’s
objective.”161 The court held that the lack of consent and the expectation of
privacy concerning the dissemination of a private sexual image was
“presumptively harmful.”162
Conversely, Minnesota holds that the intentional conduct is
“counterbalanced by the absence . . . of any requirement that the victim
actually suffer any harm.”163 It held that without an actual harm requirement,
the legislature has criminalized behavior that will have no impact on the
statutory purpose of preventing harm.164
157

10 U.S.C. § 917a(a)(3)(A)–(B).
See People v. Austin, No. 123910, 2019 IL 123910, at ¶ 103 n.1 (Ill. Oct. 18, 2019) (LEXIS) (listing
states that prohibit nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images with an intent-to-harm element).
159
10 U.S.C. § 917a(a)(3).
160
See generally 2019 IL 123910, at ¶ 101–08.
161
Id. at ¶102.
162
Id. at ¶108.
163
State v. Casillas, 938 N.W.2d 74, 85 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (omission in original) (quoting In re
Welfare of A.J.B. 929 N.W.2d 840, 861 (Minn. 2019).
164
Id. at 90–91.
158
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Article 117a lands somewhere in the middle of these two conflicting
viewpoints because it has a negligence standard tied to the intent-to-harm
element. Although there is only a subtle difference between purpose and
knowledge, recklessness and negligence are lower levels of culpability that
have rendered criminal statutes unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds.165 By having a negligence theory of culpability, Congress leaves
Article117a more vulnerable to a facial challenge based on overbreadth,
because the Article could encompass constitutionally protected speech.
However, until the Supreme Court renders a decision on the constitutionality
of any revenge porn statute, it is unknown whether even the highest level of
culpability is constitutional.
E. Military Connection
The last element under Article 117a makes one guilty of the offense
if their conduct, “under the circumstances, had a reasonably direct and
palpable connection to a military mission or military environment.”166 This
element, which is common in many UCMJ Articles, is based on a running
practice of limiting the speech of military members in order to maintain good
military order and discipline.167 In the Supreme Court case, Parker v. Levy,
the Court noted the uniqueness speech rights for members of the military:
While the members of the military are not excluded from the
protection granted by the First Amendment, the different
character of the military community and of the military
mission requires a different application of those protections.
The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent
necessity for imposition of discipline, may render
permissible within the military that which would be
constitutionally impermissible outside it.168
If the speech is of the type protected by the First Amendment but has
“a reasonably direct and palpable connection” to the military mission or
military environment, then a court need only “determine whether the
criminalization of that speech is justified despite First Amendment
concerns.”169 This practice of restricting military members’ speech is
165
See, e.g., id. at 77 (finding that the statute prohibiting nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual
images violated the First Amendment because its negligence mens rea requirement).
166
10 U.S.C. § 917a (a)(4).
167
See, e.g., id. § 934; JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL IV-135–
51 (2019), https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/2019%20MCM%20(Final)%20(201901 08).pdf?
ver=2019-01-11-115724-610 (explaining the offenses punishable under Article 134, many of which
contain the requirement of the conduct to “prejudice [the] good order and discipline of the armed forces.”).
168
417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
169
United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 449 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
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commonly known as the Doctrine of Military Necessity.170
The element of a military connection is not easily met based on
assumptions and conclusory statements. In United States v. Wilcox, a
servicemember was convicted under Article 134 for disobeying an officer, for
violating an Army regulation by distributing extremist literature, and making
a false official statement, among others.171 Specifically, the servicemember
was accused of identifying himself online as an Army Paratrooper and
advocating “racial intolerance by counseling and advising individuals on
racist views” which “under the circumstances . . . was to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit
to the armed forces . . . .”172 On appeal, the sole issue was whether the
evidence was legally sufficient to support the charged offense.173
The evidence presented by the Government at trial consisted of the
testimony of one individual who gathered evidence in the course of her online
conversations and expert testimony that confirmed the servicemember’s
online statements were consistent with the white supremacist movement.174
However, no evidence was introduced to prove the actual or potential
discredit to the armed forces.175 The Government argued that the offense was
proven because “the accused, while holding himself out as a member of the
United States Army . . . recruited others into activities involving racial
intolerance.”176 On the other hand, the defense introduced evidence from
soldiers in the servicemember’s unit that the servicemember had a “good
working relationship[] with minorities in the unit and there was no evidence
that his racist views adversely affected his military performance or his
unit.”177 The court held that although military members may have less
protective First Amendment rights, the evidence was legally insufficient to
support the conviction.178 It was pure speculation that the racist comments
were viewed, or would be viewed, by other servicemembers or be perceived
by the public as an expression of Army or military policy.179 Lastly, the court
held there was no evidence his statements had a “reasonably direct and
palpable effect on the military mission or military environment.”180 There
was no proof that the profiles were directed at other members of the military

170
Bill Kenworthy, Military Speech, FREEDOM F. INST., https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/firstamendment-center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/personal-public-expression-overview/military-speech/
(Feb. 2010).
171
Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 443.
172
Id. at 443–44 (alterations in original).
173
Id. at 445.
174
Id. at 445–46.
175
Id. at 446.
176
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 450.
180
Id. at 451.
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or that any other servicemember ever stumbled across them.181
This element in Article 117a is aimed at maintaining the
constitutionality of the criminal offense on speech, despite the split decisions
on the speech in question in state supreme courts. So long as a prosecutor can
provide sufficient evidence that there is a direct and palpable connection to
the military mission or military environment, appellate courts will generally
uphold the conviction.182
F. Article 117a Enforced
Since its enactment, there has been at least one known conviction
under the Article 117a—United States v. Roman-Cummins (“RomanCummins”).183 Defendant and victim, both servicemembers, were in a
relationship when the victim took an intimate visual image of herself on the
defendant’s phone.184 On August 8, 2018, after the victim broke up with
defendant “without explanation,” defendant then sent the photo to a fellow
Airman through the victim’s Facebook account, believing the Airman and
victim to be involved in an ongoing relationship.185 The defendant had logged
into the victim’s Facebook account through his phone without her consent.186
Through a guilty plea, the defendant admitted that the elements and
definitions of Article 117a correctly and accurately described what he did.187
In response to the military judge’s questions, the defendant admitted that the
victim did not agree that the image would be visible to the public and knew
the victim was at least eighteen years of age.188 The victim was also
identifiable in the image because one could see her face in the image.189 The
defendant also described the photo to be of a private nature between him and
the victim.190 He admitted that he knew sending the photo to the other Airman
was likely to cause embarrassment due to its private nature and believed
sending the photo would cause friction in the relationship between the victim
181

Id.
See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760–61 (1974); United States v. Brown, 45 M.J. 389, 398
(C.A.A.F. 1996); United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 571–72 (C.M.A.1972).
183
See Transcript of Record, United States v. Roman-Cummins (May 20, 2019) (Special Order AB-1)
(on file with author). This is an unpublished case. A Freedom of Information Act request was submitted
to the Department of the Air Force. In this request, the Author asked for the transcript and charge sheet of
the case. The request was approved on February 6, 2020, and the Author received both documents. The
victim’s and witnesses’ names have been redacted for privacy purposes. The Author was also present for
the sentencing of Airman First Class Roman-Cummins while a summer intern with the Air Force.
184
Id. at 10–12.
185
Id. at 11–12.
186
Id. at 12.
187
Id. at 11–12.
188
Id. at 12. These facts fulfill parts A and C of element one.
189
Id. This fact fulfills part B of element one.
190
Id. at 11. This fact fulfills element two.
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and the other Airman.191 The military judge accepted the guilty plea.192
The sentencing hearing took place on May 20, 2019.193 Multiple
witnesses from the defendant and victim’s squadron were called to testify by
the prosecution.194 One witness was one of the unit’s supervisors, who
testified on how the defendant’s actions made a negative impact on the unit.195
Since both the defendant and victim worked in the same section, the
supervisor described how one of them had to be moved to another work
area.196 Further, the supervisor testified that she had to “deal with rumor
control” amongst the Airmen in the unit for multiple hours on a daily basis,
affecting her ability to perform her other duties.197 On cross-examination and
redirect examination, the supervisor also discussed having to speak with both
the defendant and victim about not talking about the situation with other
personnel in the office.198
Both victim and defendant gave unsworn statements.199 In the
victim’s unsworn statement, she expressed the defendant’s actions made her
feel “shameful, embarrassed, disgusted and angry,” and that she had “lost
[her] trust in [her] fellow [A]irmen.”200 The defendant apologized for his
actions and asked that the court allow him to return to serve his country.201
After closing remarks and deliberation, a panel of members ordered the
defendant to a reduction to the grade of E-1, forfeiture of two-thirds pay per
month for three months, and confinement for thirty days.202
Roman-Cummins gives a clear illustration of the elements of Article
117a. Beginning with the first element, the defendant clearly “distributed”
the photo within the context of Article 117a’s definition because he
electronically transmitted the image to another airman via a social media
platform.203 The image was also an intimate visual image because it was a
digital image and revealed the victim’s “nude upper body and her hand
holding [the defendant’s] penis.”204 Identifiability of the person in the visual
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image was also met because the victim’s face was visible in the image.205 The
defendant’s admission that he did not receive the victim’s permission to send
the image establishes a lack of explicit consent required by Article 117a.206
The defendant’s mens rea would have been established through his purposeful
login to the victim’s Facebook account in order to transmit the visual image
to the Airman.207 These facts show that the first element was met.
For element two, the defendant again admitted to knowing that the
image was made under circumstances where the person depicted in the image
retained a reasonable expectation of privacy.208 Similar to the victims in
Raines, Davis, and Lee, this victim retained a reasonable expectation of
privacy because the photo was taken with her ex-boyfriend’s phone while in
a private location with him.209 A reasonable person would expect a photo such
as this one to remain between her and the defendant. The phone can be
compared to the car in Lee, because although she does not have a possessory
interest in the phone, the Fourth Amendment definition does not apply
because the term is defined by the statute.210
Element three was also met both by admission and evidence. The
defendant’s responses show not only that he knowingly, but that he
purposefully, intended to cause harm. His intent to cause embarrassment and
create friction between the victim and the other Airman meets element three
because it “harm[s] substantially the depicted person with respect to the that
person’s . . . reputation, or personal relationships.”211 The victim’s unsworn
testimony at the sentencing hearing also reveals that actual harm was caused
by the defendant’s actions.212 Coupled with this, an argument could be made
that the defendant reasonably should have known that sending an intimate
visual image of one Airman to another Airman would cause some harm to the
Airman-victim.
Lastly, Roman-Cummins creates a strong example where one’s
conduct “had a reasonably direct and palpable connection to a military
mission or military environment.”213 Such a connection was made by the
supervisor’s testimony. Changes in the unit’s functions had to be made and
gossip filtered throughout, which cost the supervisor time that could have
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been spent elsewhere.214 This affected the supervisor’s mission and the unit’s
mission. The sort of gossip surrounding revenge porn weighs heavily not only
on military environments, but any work environment. Although not every
case will be as simple as this one, Roman-Cummins is the textbook case for
the sort of actions Article 117a aims to deter.
IV. CONCLUSION
In today’s connected world, society must decide where the limits lie
with sharing content and what to do when those lines are crossed. The
enactment of Article 117a has been society’s response to those questions for
our nation’s servicemembers. After the Marines United Scandal and the lack
of justice that followed, we said “no more.” Commanders now have a new
tool to combat inappropriate behavior amongst their soldiers, airmen, sailors,
and marines. However, it is not overbearing on a servicemember’s rights
because the Article was carefully tailored to address First Amendment
concerns.
Article 117a carefully defines key terms utilized throughout the
statute, creating transparency on what sort of conduct and speech is
prohibited.215 The mens rea requirements within each element are fair,
because it distinguishes wrongful conduct from innocent conduct.216
Requiring evidence of the person’s identity in the image and the lack of their
express consent to the broadcast or distribution reiterates that Article 117a is
meant to protect victims.217
Defining the conduct and speech is only half the battle. A reasonable
expectation of privacy must be violated. Although not a recognized category
of unprotected speech outside the First Amendment, Congress deemed it
necessary in its legislation to narrow its breadth.218 State courts are also split
as to whether legislation should extend into the private matters of
nonconsensual photo sharing.219 Article 117a’s definition of “reasonable
expectation of privacy,” coupled with the multiple cases which address this
issue, creates precedent to clarify the context of this element.
An intent-to-harm element bolsters the statute’s standing against First
Amendment claims, narrowing the statute to punish only conduct which
revenge porn statutes aim to prevent.220 However, negligence may not be a
sufficient level of culpability to survive constitutional challenges.221 What it
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will come down to is Article 117a’s requirement of a “direct and palpable
connection to a military mission or military environment.”222 As history
shows, Congress has wide discretion in restricting servicemembers’ speech;
however, its boundaries do exist.223 Until the Supreme Court speaks on this
unprecedented issue, this is what we know to be true: A veteran turned victim
to revenge porn can seek justice through Article 117a.
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